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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE CULT OF AGENCY
J.B. HEATON*
“The agency approach has pointed in some intriguing directions, but it
fares poorly if judged by asking what it is that would be a counter observation or count as evidence against it. To the contrary, no phenomenon
seems beyond the reach of ‘agency costs’ and at times the phrase takes on
more of the trappings of an incantation than an analytical tool.”1
Stephen A. Ross

T

I. INTRODUCTION

HERE is no agency problem between a corporation’s shareholders
and a corporation’s directors, officers, and managers. We know this
because shareholders are not principals, and directors, officers, and managers are not shareholders’ agents. While “the separation of ownership
and control” rolls off the tongue too easily now, like an oft-repeated mantra, that separation is pure fiction. The law is crystal clear: separation is of
ownership and ownership. Corporations own assets; shareholders own
shares. A simple proof is by contradiction. If shareholders owned the corporation, then shareholders could not sue the corporation. But shareholders can sue the corporation. Therefore, shareholders do not own the
corporation. Moreover, as lawyers have understood for hundreds of years,
the separateness of shareholders and the corporation is fundamental to
the corporation’s usefulness as a method of organizing business.
What shareholders do (usually) have is the right to vote for the corporation’s directors. That vote can be powerful. It can change who the directors are or the behavior of existing directors, but it does so as an
election of officials in a sort of representative democracy: by putting in
power (or putting in fear) those who are subject to the shareholder vote.
At all times, however, elected directors have duties—including fiduciary
duties—and protections—including the business judgment rule—that
nearly always allow them to make decisions they view (or can plausibly
claim to view) as being in the “long-run” interest of the corporation and its
shareholders. They need not—except when they put the company up for
sale—maximize current shareholder value. That is the reality, and economic and legal analysis that ignores it has little chance at relevance for
the study of actual corporate behavior.
The agency-theory approach to corporate governance grew as corporations grew, built on the myth that the corporation was a fiction and that
* J.B. Heaton, P.C., jb@jbheaton.com.
1. Stephen A. Ross, Finance, in vol. 2, THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY
ECONOMICS 334 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman, eds. 1987).
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shareholders effectively had a property right in the corporation’s assets.
Much as early civilizations explained real-world phenomena by their relationship with unseen deities, agency theorists tell tales of shareholders below and managers above, where shareholders struggle to keep peace with
sacrifices (paying monitoring expenditures), managers make divine
promises to behave (incurring bonding costs), but where shareholders ultimately are left to deal with the uncontrolled whim of the gods (remaining managerial discretion).
As with primitive religions, there is, in the end, no evidence that this
mythical battle is real. Managers are usually loyal, probably because so
much of the focus of existing corporate law is on the control of managerial disloyalty. Moreover, the business world is far more competitive than
most agency-cost models assume, leaving little scope for managerial slack.
What evidence shows instead is that managers suffer from cognitive biases;
most importantly, they are too optimistic. Managerial optimism and the
flexibility of corporate law explain most arguable failures to maximize current shareholder value. Scholarship in both economics and law would improve if researchers faced these realities and left the cult of agency
behind.
Part I is straightforward but necessary, setting out the simple legal
reality that we live in a world of separation of ownership and ownership,
not of separation of ownership and control. Shareholders do not “own”
the corporation and directors and officers are not “agents” of shareholder
“principals.” The corporation is not a convenient fiction—and certainly
not a “nexus of contracts”—but a necessary and essential legal device to
partition, lock-in, and shield the firm’s assets from other entities including
shareholders. Moreover, corporate law is flatly at odds with the asserted
instruction the mythical shareholder-principal gives to her mythical manager-agent: maximize current shareholder value. Corporate law is clear
that managers need not do so, except when the directors put the company
up for sale. Instead, directors and officers are allowed and even encouraged to manage the corporation for longevity, under cover of doing
so for the long-run interests of the shareholders. Theorists ignore these
legal realities at their peril, because directors, officers, investors, and the
many professionals who serve them live within these rules when they fight
over corporate governance.
Part II explores the agency-cost paradigm for the study of the corporation. The agency-cost concept evolved from early objections to the
profit-maximization assumption of neoclassical economics. Several economists, most notably Oliver Williamson, asserted—without empirical evidence—that managers maximizing their own utility would intentionally
divert value to themselves and shirk the responsibilities of profit maximization, an approach that became known as managerial discretion. Soon, a few
economists began separately to study the economics of agency relationships. Then, most famously, Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling
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argued that agency costs were everywhere and included the sum of expenditures by the principal to prevent diversions by her agent, expenditures by the agent to bond himself from making the expected diversions,
and the remaining losses that would occur from the diversions the agent
would make anyway. Because, as Stephen Ross’s quote above suggests, the
agency approach could explain most anything—good behavior was evidence of the success of the expenditures by principal and agent, while bad
behavior was evidence of the unpreventable residual losses—agency explanations exploded. Soon, there was an agency-cost explanation for most
anything. Agency theory took economists off the hook of learning corporate law, made economic analysis of the firm the study of games between
shareholders and managers, and did so within a creative framework that
facilitated mathematics-free narratives that made for a broad debate
among academic economists and academic lawyers.
Part III brings us back to earth, arguing for the end of the cult of
agency. Despite thousands of articles invoking agency theory, there is virtually no evidence that managers do not maximize current shareholder
value because of managerial disloyalty. There likely are two reasons for
this. First, much of the focus of existing corporate law is on the control of
managerial disloyalty. It simply is not that hard to control managerial diversions of any meaningful size. Second, the business world is far more
competitive than most agency-cost models assume, leaving little scope for
managerial slack if the corporation is to survive.
Part IV argues that the empirical evidence is instead that managers,
when they fail to maximize shareholder value, do so either because corporate law allows it, because managers are too optimistic about their abilities
and the prospects of their firms, or both. Managerial optimism easily explains behaviors and mechanisms associated with agency theory and does
so more parsimoniously and with sharper predictions. The path forward—a path that promises more relevance in real-world debates about,
for example, hedge fund activism and other matters of corporate governance—recognizes both the separation of ownership and ownership, the
flexibilities of corporate law, and the cognitive bias of managerial optimism that sometimes make managers less than current-shareholder-value
maximizers.
Part V offers a brief conclusion urging corporate governance scholarship to abandon agency theory and embrace explanations that will prove
useful in the real world.
II. LEGAL

AND

ECONOMIC REALITIES

“Corporate managers are the agents of shareholders, a relationship
fraught with conflicting interests.”2
2. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986).
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“Stockholders do not direct management’s activities. Indeed, stockholders
are explicitly denied power to interfere in management’s activities. That
they may not, or rationally should not, wish to do so does not detract from
the distortion in characterizing management as their agent.”3
A. The Separation of Ownership and Ownership
There is a too-obvious legal objection to agency in the theory of the
firm: shareholders are not principals and directors and officers are not
shareholders’ agents.4 The law could not be clearer in this regard. There
is not, as Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means claimed, a “separation of ownership and control.”5 Shareholders own shares, they do not own the corporation or its assets. The moment of incorporation is a moment where
the “body corporate”6 becomes “separate and distinct” from those promoters who form it.7 At that moment, the corporation is owned by no one.
Rather, it acts through its agents, and its business and affairs are decided
by its directors,8 none of whom need be shareholders,9 and none of whom
are agents of the shareholder or the corporation.10 Corporate officers are
agents of the corporation, not the shareholders.11
This legal separateness is no fiction; it is all important. Incorporation
is special precisely because it allows for separateness: a partitioning of a set
3. Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1428 (1985).
4. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70
BUS. LAW. 1, 14 (2014) (“[T]he agency characterization also lacks legal
foundation.”).
5. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1936).
6. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 106 (2016) (“Upon the filing with the
Secretary of State of the certificate of incorporation, executed and acknowledged
in accordance with § 103 of this title, the incorporator or incorporators who
signed the certificate, and such incorporator’s or incorporators’ successors and
assigns, shall, from the date of such filing, be and constitute a body corporate, by
the name set forth in the certificate, subject to § 103(d) of this title and subject to
dissolution or other termination of its existence as provided in this chapter.”).
7. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & M. TODD HENDERSON, LIMITED LIABILITY: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 5 (2016) (“The first implication of corporate separateness is that corporations have a legally recognized personhood separate and
distinct from its shareholders and other stakeholders.”).
8. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016) (“The business and affairs
of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under
the direction of a board of directors . . . .”).
9. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (“Directors need not be stockholders unless so required by the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws.”).
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (AM. LAW INST.
2006) (“Although a corporation’s shareholders elect its directors and may have the
right to remove directors once elected, the directors are neither the shareholders’
nor the corporation’s agents as defined in this section, given the treatment of directors within contemporary corporate law in the United States.”).
11. See id. at cmt. c.
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of assets, locked-in by shareholders who then cannot pull them out,12 and
shielded from the claims of shareholders’ creditors, who otherwise might
rip the corporation apart to satisfy their claims.13 These benefits of incorporation were recognized by the seventeenth century along with all other
well-known features of corporate personality, such as limited liability.14
B. Corporate Law’s (Barely Hidden) Directives
Since the 1960s and early 1970s, the view in financial economics—
and apparently among many shareholders—has been that it is the job of
corporate managers to maximize the current value of the firm.15 This is
the same rule drilled into M.B.A. students today.16
The directive in the M.B.A. classroom has never been the directive in
the courtroom. Delaware case law, for example, requires directors to max12. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for
Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 392 (2003)
(stressing “the role that incorporation played in establishing a pool of assets that
was not subject to being liquidated or dissolved by any of the individual participants who might want to recover their investment”); see also Lynn A. Stout, The
Corporation as a Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and
the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 688 (2015) (“Put simply, once you
use your money to purchase stock in a company, your money becomes the company’s money. You have no legal power to demand it back.”).
13. See Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L. J. 387, 390 (2000) (“The truly essential aspect of asset partitioning is, in effect, the reverse of limited liability—namely, the shielding of the
assets of the entity from claims of the creditors of the entity’s owners or managers.
This means that organizational law is much more important as property law than
as contract law.”).
14. See BISHOP CARLTON HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN ENGLAND, 1800-1867 3 (1936) (“[I]n the seventeenth century the commercial advantages flowing from and incident to incorporation were becoming clear:
perpetuity or, at least, continuity of existence (and management) independent of
that of members; ease of suit against third parties or against members; transferable
shares; unlimited divisibility of the equities; and the distinct demarcation of liability for the debts of a corporation, as well as of that for the debts of its shareholders.”
(emphasis added)). Hunt observed that “[t]he importance of non-liability for the
debts of members was urged, for example, in the petition of the Silk Throwsters
for incorporation in 1692: ‘If such an undertaking should be carried on only by
articles of partnership, the stock will be liable to the particular and private debts of
the several partners, and subject to be torn to pieces by the bankruptcy of any of
them.’ ” Id. at 3–4 n.1.
15. See, e.g., ALEXANDER A. ROBICHEK & STEWART C. MYERS, OPTIMAL FINANCING
DECISIONS 2 (1965) (“This book assumes that the objective of the financial manager
is to maximize the value of the firm to its stockholders.”); see also EUGENE F. FAMA &
MERTON H. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 69 (1972) (management should
“maximize the current market value” of the firm, calling it the “market value
rule”).
16. See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPALS
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 7 (2014) (“A smart and effective manager makes decisions
that increase the current value of the company’s shares and the wealth of its
stockholders.”).
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imize the “long run interests of shareholders”;17 they have no duty (absent
a change of control transaction) to do that which “will best maximize the
corporation’s current stock price.”18 As Vice Chancellor Travis Laster put
it:
The fiduciary obligation to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders does not mean that directors must sacrifice greater value that can be achieved over the
long term in pursuit of short-term strategies, and it certainly does
not mean that directors must attempt to maximize the . . . public
company’s stock price on a daily or quarterly basis. The fiduciary
relationship requires that directors act prudently, loyally, and in
good faith to maximize the corporation’s value over the longterm for its stockholders’ benefit.19
I have argued elsewhere that the short term-long term rhetoric that
Delaware courts use in their corporate-law opinions masks the real contest,
one between a rational desire by clear-sighted shareholders for shareholder value maximization, on the one hand, and a desire by courts and
others for long-term corporate survival—on the other.20 Delaware courts
use the rhetoric of the “long term” to take pressure off directors to do
exactly that which finance professors teach their M.B.A. students. In
reality,
directors, when acting deliberately, in an informed way, and in
the good faith pursuit of corporate interests, may follow a course
designed to achieve long-term value even at the cost of immediate value maximization.21
Delaware’s current Chief Justice, former Chancellor Leo Strine, has
tipped his hand in recent commentary, revealing that what he wants is for
corporations to focus on longevity, not shareholder-value maximization.
Consider some of his statements:
17. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 772 (2015) (quoting TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT
Acquisition Corp., Civ. A. Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar.
2, 1989)).
18. Id. at 774.
19. Virtus Capital L.P. v. Eastman Chem. Co., Civ. A. No. 9808-VCL, 2015 WL
580553, at *16 n.5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 2015) (citation omitted).
20. J.B. Heaton, The “Long Term” in Corporate Law, 72 BUS. LAW. 353, 356
(2017); see also Robert Anderson IV, The Long and Short of Corporate Governance, 23
GEO. MASON L. REV. 19, 20 (2015) (“Even assuming that institutional investors
have short investment horizons, the linchpin of the argument—that short-horizon
investors will push for policies harmful in the long-term—lacks a foundation. That
assertion is inconsistent with basic principles of mainstream financial
economics.”).
21. See Air Prod. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 124–25 (Del. Ch.
2011) (internal quotation omitted).
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The rights given to stockholders to make proposals and vote on
corporate business are premised on the theory that stockholders
have an interest in increasing the sustainable profitability of the
firm.22
In sum, real investors want what we as a society want and we as
end-user, individual investors want; which is for corporations to
create sustainable wealth.23
[T]o foster sustainable economic growth, stockholders themselves
must act like genuine investors, who are interested in the creation and preservation of long-term wealth, not short-term movements in stock prices.24
The focus of many . . . institutions on quarterly earnings and
other short-term metrics is fundamentally inconsistent with the
objectives of most of their end-user investors, people saving primarily for two purposes, to put their kids through college and to
fund their own retirements. These end-user investors do not
care about quarterly earnings or short-term gimmicks. These
end-user investors want corporations to produce sustainable
wealth that will be there when they need it.25
Put simply, Chief Justice Strine wants corporate boards “to strike the
proper balance between the pursuit of profits through risky endeavors and
the prudent preservation of value.”26 These are not the words of currentshareholder-value maximization; these are the words of longevity, of
survivability. This is the legal backdrop that supports managers. This is
the reality that M.B.A. (and law) students find when they enter the corporate world.
III. AGENCY COSTS

IN

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

A. Origins of Agency in Corporate Scholarship
A huge amount of scholarship in corporate law and financial economics assumes the existence of agency costs; losses that result from expenditures to prevent managerial disloyalty plus the loss of shareholder value
from disloyalty that occurs despite these expenditures. The agency-cost
view has its roots in challenges, quite vigorous by the 1940s, to the neoclassical economics assumption that firms—especially firms with significant
22. Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face:
Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act
and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 8 (2010) (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 18 n.54 (emphasis added).
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market power—act to maximize profits.27 Defenders of the profit-maximization paradigm acknowledged the possibility—and possible importance—of nonpecuniary benefits to managers of the firms in the markets
the economists studied,28 largely because they recognized that managers
would maximize their own utility subject to constraints.29 That said, it was
not obvious in these early days that considering “managerial motivations”
would lead away from profit maximization, because both shareholders and
managers might desire profit maximization for different reasons. The
shareholder would want to “increas[e] the size of his dividends”; the manager would want “profits to ensure the firm’s safety, or to make it grow
larger, or for various other reasons.”30 Though Professor J.R. Hicks suggested that managers might pursue monopoly so they could enjoy the
“quiet life,”31 other economists recognized that external and internal realities (including competition from other managers for the job of the quietlife seeker) could force managers to pursue profit maximization, or something close to it.32
By 1963, however, Professor Oliver Williamson had staked out positions that turned managerial motivations into the study of managerial discretion.33 Recognizing that any attempt to measure discretionary concerns
27. See T. de Scitovsky, A Note on Profit Maximization and Its Implications, 11 REV.
ECON. STUD. 57 (1943) (developing an analysis to show that profit maximization
implies specific preferences on behalf of the entrepreneur that may not hold); see
also M.W. Reder, A Reconsideration of Marginal Productivity Theory, 55 J. POL. ECON.
450, 450 (1947) (“The current theory of the firm assumes explicitly that the firm is
operated in such a way as to maximize its profits.”).
28. See Fritz Malchup, Marginal Analysis and Empirical Research, 36 AMER. ECON.
REV. 519, 527 (1946) (“As a matter of fact, the nature, strength and effects of nonpecuniary considerations in business behavior are problems that need to be investigated. One may presume that producing larger production volumes, paying
higher wage rates, or charging lower product prices than would be compatible
with a maximum of money profits may involve for the business man a gain in social
prestige or a certain measure of inner satisfaction.”).
29. See Leonid Hurwicz, Theory of the Firm and of Investment, 14 ECONOMETRICA
109, 110 (1946) (“Thus the entrepreneur’s psychological make-up (somewhat belatedly) enters the picture, and, at least implicitly, profit maximization is replaced
by utility maximization.”); see also GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION
(1957).
30. C. Addision Hickman, Managerial Motivation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 794,
798–99 (1952); see also C. Addison Hickman, Managerial Motivation and the Theory of
the Firm, 45 AMER. ECON. REV. 544 (1955) (proposing the study of managerial
motivations).
31. J.R. Hicks, The Theory of Monopoly, 3 ECONOMETRICA 1, 8 (1935) (“The best
of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.”).
32. See, e.g., P.W.S. Andrews & Elizabeth Bruner, Business Profits and the Quiet
Life, 11 J. INDUS. ECON. 72, 78 (1962) (“If businesses are to avoid getting into difficulties, we suggest that a devotion to a quiet life will not help them and that they
have to have a zealous regard for profits—but not necessarily for profits in the
short term.”).
33. See Oliver E. Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 1032 (1963) [hereinafter Managerial Discretion]. Williamson later acknowledged that he was addressing a problem some thought nonexistent. See OLI-
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directly would be too difficult, Williamson assumed the existence of managerial desires for nonpecuniary benefits like “security, power, prestige, and
so forth”34 and then asked “to what activities do these motives give rise?”35
This was a valid intellectual move that kept with the methodological spirit
of the times. It was, by 1963, acceptable among mainstream economists to
make assumptions that might be “unrealistic” so long as testable predictions followed.36 Williamson’s assumption that managers used their discretion to divert resources to themselves and did not put their full efforts
into maximizing profits did not strike too many as unrealistic. Defenses of
old-style profit maximization theories tended to fall back on their usefulness as a benchmark and the fact they were more testable.37 Indeed, it
may have been the accepted realism of Williamson’s assumptions that excused the empirical failures his theories encountered.38
As the 1970s began, Professor Williamson’s39 theories of managerial
discretion were a distinct strand of the economics literature.40 Objections
E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR: MANAGERIAL
OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF THE FIRM 1 (1974) (“To some observers it has been
almost self-evident that the opportunities for discretion are extensive and that discretionary behavior is widely exhibited, while to others it has been unclear that in
any significant sense such options even exist, much less are exercised.”).
34. See Williamson, Managerial Discretion, supra note 33, at 1034.
35. Id.
36. This was the thesis of Milton Friedman’s famous essay on methodology in
economics. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, THE METHODOLOGY OF POSITIVE ECONOMICS, IN
ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 7 (1953) (“The ultimate goal of a positive science is
the development of a ‘theory’; or ‘hypothesis’ that yields valid and meaningful
(i.e., not truistic) predictions about phenomena not yet observed.”).
37. See H.T. Koplin, The Profit Maximization Assumption, 15 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 130, 130 (1963) (“The profit maximization assumption has long been under
attack, chiefly on grounds that it lacks realism. It fails, the argument runs, to take
adequate account of alternative desires of the businessman, for power, leisure, social prestige, and similar non-monetary rewards. The possibility of incorporating
these benefits into a more general theory of profit maximization has been considered, but rejected, by writers who feel the assumption would thereby be made tautological and/or unusable.”).
38. A number of economists found Williamson’s empirical findings lacking,
because the main prediction of his approach concerning expenses did not hold in
the data. See Loretta J. Mester, Testing for Expense Preference Behavior: Mutual versus
Stock Savings and Loans, 20 RAND J. ECON. 483, 483 (1983) (“The results of this test
do not support earlier conclusions of managerial expense preferences.”); Michael
Smirlock & William Marshall, Monopoly Power and Expense-Preference Behavior: Theory
and Evidence to the Contrary, 14 BELL. J. ECON. 166, 167 (1983) (“[Our] results provide no support for the hypothesized relationship between monopoly power and
expense-preference behavior.”).
39. Other joined him. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR,
VALUE AND GROWTH (1959) (observing that businesses seem to maximize sales subject to achieving a satisfactory level of profits).
40. See Sidney G. Winter, Satisficing, Selection, and the Innovating Remnant, 85 Q.
J. ECON. 237, 237 (1971) (“The . . . ‘managerial,’ strand emphasizes the fact that
the large size, diffused stock ownership, and market power of the modern corporation leave the management with significant freedom to pursue its own goals, which
VER
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to the testability of the theory found relatively few takers,41 and variants on
the theory, such as the theory of “X-Inefficiency,” grew in the literature as
well.42 Nevertheless, the real breakthrough was to come elsewhere.
A. Jensen & Meckling’s Agency Theory of the Firm
Until the mid-to-late 1970s, finance scholars remained committed to
the idea that managers maximized current market values. Professors Eugene Fama and Merton Miller argued in 1972 that “despite many years of
controversy, [it has not] yet been demonstrated that the market value rule
leads to predictions that are so widely at variance with observed management behavior as to rule it out, even as a first approximation . . . .”43
Moreover, other economists had argued that managers within the firm
could coordinate the actions of labor to arrive at efficient outcomes.44 In
other words, it was not yet time, in finance at least, to embrace a managerial-discretion view instead of a loyal-manager view.
The first step in that direction within finance was taken, almost as an
afterthought, by Professor Stephen Ross, who advanced a general economic analysis of agency theory along with a suggestion that it might apply
to managers and shareholders:45
To mention one more path of interest—in a world of true uncertainty where adequate contingent markets do not exist, the manager of the firm is essentially an agent of the shareholders. It
can, therefore, be expected that an understanding of the agency
relationship will aid our understanding of this difficult
question.46
Jensen and Meckling pursued Ross’s suggestion at full speed, setting
out an ambitious agenda for an agency approach in their landmark 1976
paper, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure.47 Jensen and Meckling sought to develop a theory of ownership
are not correctly represented as maximization of profit on behalf of the
stockholders.”).
41. See R. Rees, A Reconsideration of the Expense Preference Theory of the Firm, 41
ECONOMICA 295, 307 (1974) (concluding, after extensive analysis that “difficulties
would arise in testing the expense preference theory against competing theories of
the firm”).
42. See Harvey Leibenstein, Aspects of X-Inefficiency Theory of the Firm, 6 BELL J.
ECON. 580, 603–04 (1975) (“Because of self-interest implicit in the degree of constraint concern, individuals are unlikely to choose effort positions which maximize
their contribution to firm output.”).
43. See Fama & Miller, supra note 15, at 75.
44. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AMER. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
45. See Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency, 63 AMER. ECON. REV.
134 (1973).
46. Id. at 138.
47. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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as split between insiders and outsiders.48 They summarily dismissed prior
work on the theory of the firm, including Williamson’s.49 Then, in setting
out their theory, they “define[d] agency costs as the sum of: (1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the
agent, [and] (3) the residual loss.”50
The impact of Jensen and Meckling’s paper came mostly from its assertion that “the relationship between the stockholders and manager of a
corporation fit the definition of a pure agency relationship . . . .”51 They
offered a remarkably elastic theory of how agency costs could arise in the
corporation:
The magnitude of the agency costs discussed above will vary from
firm to firm. It will depend on the tastes of managers, the ease
with which they can exercise their own preferences as opposed to
value maximization in decision making, and the costs of monitoring and bonding activities. The agency costs will also depend
upon the cost of measuring the manager’s (agent’s) performance and evaluating it, the cost of devising and applying an index
for compensating the manager which correlates with the owner’s
(principal’s) welfare, and the cost of devising and enforcing specific behavioral rules or policies.52
If this statement came close to an admission that the agency-cost paradigm was too flexible, with too many degrees of freedom, and therefore
capable of explaining most anything, Jensen and Meckling did not admit
it. But the problem is there for all to see. An outcome—often one that is
far from obviously tied to an agency problem—that seems reasonable can
48. Id. at 306, 312–13.
49. Id. at 307.
50. Id. at 308. While Jensen and Meckling apparently were unaware of it, that
exact view of monitoring costs was earlier published by an assistant professor of
political science at Ohio State University, Barry Mitnick, who called it investments
in “policing”:
Assume that the principal for some reason wishes to police his agent.
Note that one form of policing would be encouraging the agent to hold
the fiduciary norm; we will not, however, consider here the actual mode
of policing. Assume that the principal has no outside source of resources
to devote to a policing mechanism. He must then divert some of the total
discretionary resources potentially available to be distributed towards his
own and the agent’s ends into a policing apparatus.
Barry M. Mitnick, The Theory of Agency: The Policing “Paradox” and Regulatory Behavior, 24 PUB. CHOICE 27, 31 (1975). Mitnick also anticipated the third component
of Jensen and Meckling’s agency costs—the residual loss—showing that policing
might solve only part of the loss in an agency relationship. Id. at 33–36. Bonding
expenditures by the agent were the only novel contribution in the Jensen and
Meckling definition of agency costs.
51. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 47, at 309.
52. Id. at 328.
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always be explained by solutions to the asserted agency-cost problem;53 an
outcome that seems unreasonable can always be explained by residual
losses from agency costs that could not be controlled. When all these arguments hinge on asserted costs that are unobservable, the resulting explanations may be no more than “just so stories.”54
The agency-cost paradigm provides an inviting framework for theorizing about corporations and their managers, but, as the opening quote
by Stephen Ross puts it, “it fares poorly if judged by asking what it is that
would be a counter observation or count as evidence against it.”55 For
example, managers who use cash flow to acquire companies can be characterized as empire-builders wasting shareholder funds,56 while managers
who do not expand their businesses can be characterized as being unfaithful by enjoying the “quiet life.”57 Nothing seems beyond the explanatory
power of agency costs, but not in a good way.
B. The Consolation of Agency
When Jensen and Meckling confined their attention to “the analysis
of agency costs generated by the contractual arrangements between the
owners and top management of the corporation,”58 they presumably knew
that shareholders do not enter into such arrangements with the corporation’s top management. To get around this inconvenience, they introduced what has become, arguably, one of the more troublesome turns of
phrase ever used in law and economics, the nexus of contracts:
It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply
legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships
among individuals . . . . The private corporation or firm is simply
one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible
residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which
53. See Ronald W. Anderson, M. Ceclia Bustamante, Stephane Guibaud &
Mihail Zervos, Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover, 73 J. FIN. 419, 422
(2018) (modeling an agency problem, and then interpreting data as consistent
with the model’s prediction of an optimal contract).
54. RUDYARD KIPLING, JUST SO STORIES (1902) (illustrating idea that unexplainable truths must be accepted as “just so”).
55. Ross, supra note 1, at 334.
56. See Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Agency Problems at Dual-Class
Companies, 64 J. FIN. 1697, 1722 (2009) (“Specifically, as the insider control rightscash flow rights divergence becomes larger, outside shareholders raise the discount on an extra dollar of corporate cash holdings, CEOs receive greater compensation, and managers engage in more inefficient empire-building activities
such as acquisitions and large capital expenditures.”).
57. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life?
Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043, 1043 (2003)
(“Our results suggest that active empire building may not be the norm and that
managers may instead prefer to enjoy the quiet life.”).
58. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 47, at 309.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol64/iss2/2

12

Heaton: Corporate Governance and the Cult of Agency

2019]

CULT

OF

AGENCY

213

can generally be sold without permission of the other contracting individuals . . . . Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to try to
distinguish those things which are “inside” the firm (or any other
organization) from those things that are “outside” of it. There is
in a very real sense only a multitude of complex relationships
(i.e., contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor, material and capital inputs and the consumers of
output.59
It is difficult to overstate the importance of Jensen and Meckling’s
nexus of contracts assertion in explaining the rise of agency theory in corporate law and finance.60 Disregarding the corporation as a fictional entity encouraged economists to avoid learning corporate law in their study
of the firm. Economists could study the interactions between individuals
in disregard of the firm and perhaps even in disregard of notions of “ownership” altogether.61 Unfortunately, this sort of law-free analysis often
misses the most basic legal restrictions that control the asserted behavior
under study.62
Moreover, Jensen and Meckling’s nexus of contracts assertion was so
vague that agency theory offered the chance for debate about corporate
finance to occur in narrative form equally available to legal scholars and
economists alike, a true advantage for interdisciplinary acceptance. At a
time when asset-pricing research presented a relatively high mathematical
bar for those outside finance, agency theory as applied in corporate law
and finance provided a creative framework for almost endless speculation
about important matters, often without any mathematics at all. Finance
scholars extended their influence by couching arguments non-mathematically, such as Michael Jensen’s elegantly short article arguing that debt was
good because it absorbed free cash flow, and that takeovers disciplined
59. Id. at 310–11 (emphasis in original).
60. The nexus of contracts assertion has long the subject of criticism by legal
scholars. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric
of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1444 (1985) (“Analyzing the corporation in
terms of a ‘nexus of contracts,’ and even in terms of agency costs, casts the problem in a framework that implies less managerial discretion and more effective remedial options for investors than institutional impediments permit. The analyses
embody serious descriptive inaccuracies, which, in turn, infect the normative consequences implicitly suggested by a regime of private autonomy and thereby make
them inapposite for a world in which one of the ‘parties’ assumed to be able to
bargain is a collectivity of widely dispersed individuals and the other is a coherent
group.”); William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989) (criticizing the nexus of contracts view).
61. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288, 290 (1980) (“In this ‘nexus of contracts’ perspective, ownership of the
firm is an irrelevant concept.”).
62. See Stewart C. Myers & Raghuram Rajan, The Paradox of Liquidity, 113 Q. J.
ECON. 733 (1998). The model of Myers and Rajan ignores the impact of fraudulent transfer law in preventing nearly all the problems they identify. Much of the
“property rights” literature suffers from this problem.
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managers who otherwise would waste free cash flow.63 Legal scholars
could access the economics literature with narratives built on agency arguments.64 Most debate about the takeovers of the 1980s occurred in the
framework of mathematics-free applications of agency arguments.65
The influence of agency theory is awe-inspiring. Jensen and
Meckling’s article is the third most cited in major economics journals according to a leading citation study.66 Decades after Jensen and Meckling’s
article, it is still common to motivate research in opening paragraphs by
reference to their theoretical propositions.67
IV. THE FALSE GOD

OF

AGENCY

A. The Paramount (but Ignored) Role of Corporate Law
Despite its influence, more than forty years of active research have yet
to uncover any good evidence that managers are systematically disloyal
and that the focuses of agency theories—financing decisions, investment
decisions, and the like—are best understood as related to agency
problems. Instead, there are good reasons to think that systematic, intentionally disloyal behavior is highly unlikely.68 Early experimental evidence
suggested that investigation and sanctions eliminate most shirking of the
kind asserted by Jensen and Meckling.69 This matters because “[m]ost of
corporate law is concerned with the array of substantive rules and proce63. See Jensen, supra note 2, at 323.
64. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. 650 (1984).
65. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders’ Welfare, 36 BUS. LAW. 1733, 1736 (1981) (“These ‘agency costs’
are an inevitable consequence of the separation of ownership and control in the
large publicly held corporation.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L. J. 698, 705 (1982) (“Corporate control transactions can reduce agency costs if better managers obtain control of the firm’s
assets or if they alter the incentive structure facing existing managers.”).
66. See E. Han Kim, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, What Has Mattered to Economics Since 1970, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 192 (2006).
67. See Matthew O’Connor & Matthew Rafferty, Corporate Governance and Innovation, 47 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 397, 397 (2012) (“Jensen and Meckling
(1976) show that agency problems are an inherent part of modern corporations
with diffuse ownership structures. The agency problem arises because the executives who run the firm are not the same individuals as the shareholders. As long as
it is difficult or costly for the shareholders to monitor the executives, the executives will have an incentive to engage in behavior that maximizes their utility rather
than the wealth of the shareholders.”).
68. Attempts to measure agency costs directly have been unconvincing, partly
because they must use only small businesses for comparison. See James S. Ang,
Rebel A. Cole & James Wuh Lin, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 55 J. FIN. 81,
104 (2000) (“[U]s[ing] data on small businesses to examine how agency costs vary
with a firm’s ownership structure.”).
69. See Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, Russell J. Lundholm & Wilfred C.
Uecker, A Laboratory Investigation of the Moral Hazard Problem in an Agency Relationship, 23 J. ACCT. RES. 81 (1985).
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dural devices that are aimed at controlling managerial slack and diversion
while preserving adequate discretion to carry out business operations efficiently.”70 It simply may be the case that the plain-vanilla constraints of
corporate law are just too powerful to leave much to do for debt, large
shareholders, and takeovers in controlling intentional managerial disloyalty, certainly among large U.S. corporations. If so, there is considerable
irony here. As argued above, Jensen and Meckling’s disregard of the firm
as a fiction relieved economists from studying the very mechanisms of corporate law that may control most problems that arise from self-interested
utility maximization by the corporation’s directors and officers.
Writers too easily dismiss the power of shareholder derivative suits.71
An active plaintiffs’ bar and sophisticated investors challenge compensation decisions,72 efforts to usurp corporate opportunities,73 gross mismanagement,74 go-private transactions,75 and transactions that strip assets
from the corporation.76 Research demonstrates the importance of such
litigation in controlling much of the behavior targeted in agency-cost
theories.77
70. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW xxiii (1986).
71. See Jill E. Fisch, The Overstated Promise of Corporate Governance, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 923, 937 (2010) (“The business judgment rule has the practical effect of limiting state law litigation to transactions involving self-dealing or conflicts of interest.
As a result of this limitation, it is unsurprising that empirical studies of derivative
litigation find it to be relatively ineffective.”). Of course, effectiveness in transactions involving self-dealing and conflict of interest is effectiveness in a significant
part (though not all) of what agency theory claims is at stake.
72. See Espinoza v. Zuckerberg, 124 A.3d 47, 66 (Del. Ch. 2015) (“The entire
fairness standard of review requires defendants to establish that the transaction was
the product of both fair dealing and fair price. Because defendants relied solely
on a ratification defense, they did not attempt to produce evidence of entire fairness sufficient to show an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, nor have
they demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the entire
fairness of the 2013 Compensation.”).
73. See In re Riverstone Nat’l, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. CV 9796-VCG, 2016
WL 4045411, at *17 (Del. Ch. July 28, 2016) (denying motion to dismiss claim that
merger extinguished claim of usurpation of a corporate opportunity).
74. See Benchmark Capital Partners VII v. Kalanick, No. 2017-0575, 2018 WL
587180, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2018) (unpublished order dismissing with
prejudice).
75. See Icahn Partners LP v. Zyskind, No. 2018-0358 (Del. Ch. filed May 21,
2018). (challenging the go-private transaction of AmTrust Financial Services,
Inc.).
76. See GPM Investments v. Sun Capital Partners IV, No. 1:18-cv-00796 (D.
Del. filed May 25, 2018) (challenging transactions by private equity owner).
77. See Dain C. Donelson & Christopher G. Yust, Litigation Risk and Agency
Costs: Evidence from Nevada Corporate Law, 57 J. L. & ECON. 747, 750 (2014)
(“[E]vidence that corporate officer and director litigation risk appears to be a powerful governance mechanism that significantly enhances firm value and constrains
managerial behavior. Our findings highlight the importance of litigation risk as a
mechanism to mitigate agency costs between corporate insiders and outside
shareholders.”).
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B. That Little Matter of Dog-Eat-Dog Competition
There is no question that adding the assumption of managerial disloyalty to models where shareholders want value maximization can generate
the subtlest of academic contests. Paper after paper builds complex
agency explanations of important corporate matters.78 But virtually none
of this research confronts the objection that real-world managers face brutal business competition that constrains the ability to shirk and divert.79
Jensen and Meckling admitted the problem, although buried in footnote
thirty of their paper: “Where competitors are numerous and entry is easy,
persistent departures from profit maximizing behavior inexorably leads to
extinction. Economic natural selection holds the stage.”80
But having admitted this devastating possibility, they dismiss it with
circular argument, claiming:
[T]he existence of competition in product and factor markets
will not eliminate the agency costs due to managerial control
problems as has often been asserted . . . If my competitors all
incur agency costs equal to or greater than mine I will not be
eliminated from the market by their competition.81
Assuming that agency costs will exist despite competition because
agency costs exist everywhere is unpersuasive. This argument is yet another example of the unconstrained nature of agency-cost theories, but
one that persuades only the believers.
C. A Path Forward
There is a path out of the cult of agency. It is a path that will lead to
better scholarship on corporate governance, scholarship that also is likely
to help directors and officers better manage corporate assets. It should
not surprise us that agency theories have so little influence outside the
academy. The notion of corporate directors and managers looking for
78. See Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, Why Do Managers Diversify
Their Firms? Agency Reconsidered, 58 J. FIN. 71, 73 (2003) (“We find that firm performance is increasing in incentives and decreasing in diversification, consistent
with the previous literature. More importantly, we find evidence that diversification is increasing in incentives . . . . We show that the negative relationship found
in those studies is the result of unobserved, firm-specific factors. We control for
these factors by using firm-level fixed effects. The result that diversification is increasing in incentives suggests that changes in incentives and diversification are
due to changes in the private benefits associated with diversification.”).
79. See Rui Albuquerque & Neng Wang, Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset
Pricing, 63 J. FIN. 1 (2008) (developing a dynamic model of a firm without modeling competitors); Peter DeMarzo & Michael J. Fishman, Agency and Optimal Investment Dynamics, 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 151 (2007) (same); Peter M. DeMarzo, Michael J.
Fishman, Zhiguo He & Neng Wang, Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment, 67
J. FIN. 2295 (2012) (same); Boris Nikolov & Toni M. Whited, Agency Conflicts and
Cash: Estimates from a Dynamic Model, 69 J. FIN. 1883 (2014) (same).
80. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 47, at 329 n.30.
81. Id. at 330.
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every self-serving opportunity to shirk their duties in favor of flying the
corporate jet to an Aspen ski vacation—or acquire the next unnecessary
company to build their empire like a Lego project—strikes directors, officers, and their professional advisers, like bankers and lawyers, as flatly
untrue. It is possible, of course, to find isolated examples of corporate
management that indulges in excessive perks and avoids tough decisions.
Nevertheless, most top corporate managers—up before dawn, sacrificing
family relationships and health to their work, and fighting day after day in
competitive markets—react with justified scorn that academic theory views
them as people who avoid the search for profitable projects “because it
requires too much trouble or effort on their part to manage or to learn
about new technologies . . . result[ing] in the value of the firm being substantially lower than it otherwise could be.”82 The path forward can combine two things: (1) better knowledge (or attention to knowledge already
acquired) of how corporate law currently encourages deviations from
shareholder value maximization, and (2) the application of behavioral
corporate finance. I already have addressed the flexibility of corporate
law. I turn now to behavioral corporate finance.
Unlike agency theory, where no evidence shows that managers are
intentionally disloyal, a great deal of evidence shows that managers are
miscalibrated.83 And by contrast to agency costs, it is possible to measure
optimism.84 Work on managerial optimism builds on results in the psychology literature demonstrating that individuals tend to make systematically biased probability assessments when estimating event likelihood.85
Optimism is particularly well suited to corporate governance because evidence shows that individuals are not only confident in the validity of their
current beliefs but also are confident that others, given sufficient time, will
come around to seeing the correctness of those beliefs as well.86 The
managerial-optimism approach already has made great strides in the last
82. Id. at 313.
83. See, e.g., Itzhak Ben-David, John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, Managerial Miscalibration, 128 Q. J. ECON. 1547 (2013) (presenting survey results showing
that managers are severely miscalibrated in their beliefs); John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey & Manju Puri, Managerial Attitudes and Corporate Actions, 109 J. FIN.
ECON. 103 (2013) (providing evidence that CEO’s behavioral traits such as optimism and managerial risk-aversion are related to corporate financial policies);
Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Behavioral CEOs: On the Role of Managerial Overconfidence, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 37, 57 (2015) (“A large and growing body of evidence
suggests that a substantial share of top corporate executives exhibit symptoms of
overconfidence in their decisions.”).
84. See Manju Puri & David T. Robinson, Optimism and Economic Choice, 86 J.
FIN. ECON. 71 (2007) (examining measures of optimism).
85. See Shelly E. Taylor & Jonathan D. Brown, Illusion and Well-Being: A Social
Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOL. BULL. 193 (1988); Neil Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 806 (1980).
86. See Todd Rogers, Don A. Moore & Michael I. Norton, The Belief in a
Favorable Future, 28 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1290 (2017).
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two decades, providing more parsimonious predictions and evidence that
does not rely on unobservable information asymmetries and agency
costs.87 It explains the preference managers have for internal finance and
why free cash flow is dangerous for firms with optimistic managers.88 It
predicts overpayment by managers in mergers and acquisitions and other
corporate investment patterns.89 It also explains more financial misstatements than intentional activity.90 In addition, managerial optimism explains why managers dislike paying dividends but like repurchasing
stock.91 Managerial optimism also explains security issuances and financ87. For surveys of behavioral corporate finance, see Malcolm Baker, Richard
Ruback & Jeffrey Wurgler, Behavioral Corporate Finance: A Survey, in vol. 1, HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 145 (B. Espen Eckbo
ed., 2007) (surveying behavioral corporate finance); Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Behavioral Corporate Finance: An Updated Survey, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 357 (G.M. Constantinides, M. Harris, & R.M. Stulz, eds., 2013)
(same); Simon Gervais, Capital Budgeting and Other Investment Decisions, in BEHAVIORAL FINANCE: INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND MARKETS 413 (H. Kent Baker &
John R. Nofsinger eds., 2010) (surveying literature on behavioral biases showing
that biased managers overinvest their firm’s free cash flows, initiate too many
mergers, start more firms and more novel projects, and tend to stick with unprofitable investment policies longer).
88. See J.B. Heaton, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT.
33 (2002) (showing that managerial optimism predicts pecking-order capital structure preferences and problems with free cash flow); Dirk Hackbarth, Managerial
Traits and Capital Structure Decisions, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 843 (2008)
(studying the impact of managerial optimism on capital structure choices); Yuehhsiang Lin, Shing-yang Hu & Ming-shen Chen, Testing Pecking Order Prediction From
the Viewpoint of Managerial Optimism: Some Empirical Evidence from Taiwan, 16 PACIFICBASIN FIN. J. 160 (2008) (confirming predictions of Heaton’s model that optimistic
managers exhibit greater net-debt-issue/financing-deficit sensitivities than do nonoptimistic ones); Winifred Huang-Meier, Neophytos Lambertides & James M.
Steeley, Motives for Corporate Cash Holdings: The CEO Optimism Effect, 47 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 699 (2016) (finding, consistent with predictions of managerial
optimism, that optimistic managers are reluctant to use external funds and hoard
cash for growth opportunities, use more cash for capital expenditure and acquisitions, and save more cash in bad times).
89. See Yueh-hsiang Lin, Shing-yang Hu & Ming-shen Chen, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Investment: Some Empirical Evidence from Taiwan, 13 PACIFIC-BASIN
FIN. J. 523 (2005) (testing J.B. Heaton’s managerial optimism on Taiwanese market data and confirming its predictions); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, CEO
Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, 60 J. FIN. 2661 (2005) (finding that the investment of overconfident CEOs is more responsive to cash flow).
90. See Catherine M. Schrand & Sarah L.C. Zechman, Executive Overconfidence
and the Slippery Slope to Financial Misreporting, 53 J. ACCT. & ECON. 311 (2012) (finding that three quarters of financial misstatements reflect an optimistic bias that is
not necessarily intentional); see also Anwer S. Ahmed & Scott Duellman, Managerial
Overconfidence and Accounting Conservatism, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 1 (2013) (finding robust
evidence of a negative relation between CEO overconfidence and accounting
conservatism).
91. See Sanjay Deshmukh, Anand M. Goel & Keith M. Howe, CEO Overconfidence and Dividend Policy, 22 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 440 (2013) (finding that the
level of dividend payout is about one-sixth lower in firms managed by CEOs who
are more likely to be optimistic, consistent with the preference of such managers
for internal financing); Pei-Gi Shu, Yin-Hua Yeh, Tsui-Lin Chiang & Jui-Yi Hung,
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ing choices,92 as well as the investment choices managers make with the
funds they raise.93
Moreover, managerial optimism, while quite parsimonious, allows for
a rich set of interactions among outsiders (whether large shareholders or
hedge fund activists), directors, and the firm’s managers.94 The managerial optimism approach may also help explain the role of outsiders in corporate governance, perhaps the single-greatest claim of the agency
approach.95 Researchers have argued that organizational optimism is best
alleviated by introducing an “outside” view, one capable of identifying all
Managerial Overconfidence and Share Repurchases, 13 INT’L REV. FIN. 39 (2013) (finding that managerial overconfidence is positively correlated with the intensity of
share repurchasing, which is measured by scale, execution, frequency, and the difference between the announced price and post-execution price).
92. See Ronghong Huang, Kelvin Jui Keng Tan & Robert W.Faff, CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Debt Maturity, 36 J. CORP. FIN. 93 (2016) (finding that firms
with overconfident CEOs tend to adopt a shorter debt maturity structure by using
a higher proportion of short-term debt (due within 12 months)); Po-Hsin Ho,
Chia-Wei Huang, Chih-Yung Lin & Ju-FangYen, CEO Overconfidence and Financial
Crisis: Evidence from Bank Lending and Leverage, 120 J. FIN. ECON. 194 (2016) (finding that banks with overconfident CEOs were more likely to weaken lending standards in advance of a crisis); Luı́s Santos-Pinto & Michele Dell’Era, Entrepreneurial
Optimism and the Market for New Issues, 58 INT’L ECON. REV. 383 (2017) (examining
the impact of optimism in new issues of equity); Sanaz Aghazadeh, Lili Sun, Qian
Wang & Rong Yang, Investors’ Perception of CEO Overconfidence: Evidence from the Cost
of Equity Capital, REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT (forthcoming) (finding evidence
that managerial optimism impacts the cost of equity).
93. See Dirk Hackbarth, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing: A Behavioral Perspective, 15 J. CORP. FIN. 389 (2009) (applying a real options framework to analyze the
effects of managerial optimism and overconfidence on the interaction between
financing and investment decisions); Ulrike Malmendier, Geoffrey Tate & Jon Yan,
Overconfidence and Early-life Experiences: The Effect of Managerial Traits on Corporate
Financial Policies, 66 J. FIN. 1687 (2011) (finding that measurable managerial characteristics have significant explanatory power for corporate financing decisions);
Chih-Yung Wang, Yu-Fen Chen & Chia-Wen Yu, Managerial Optimism and Post-Financing Stock Performance in Taiwan: A Comparison of Debt and Equity Financing, 119
ECON. LETTERS 332 (2013) (presenting evidence that corporate financing decisions
in Taiwan are driven by managerial optimism).
94. See T. Colin Campbell, Michael Gallmeyer, Shane A. Johnson, Jessica
Rutherford & Brooke W. Stanley, CEO Optimism and Forced Turnover, 101 J. FIN.
ECON. 695 (2011) (analyzing suboptimal and optimal levels of managerial optimism); Gilles Hilary, Charles Hsu, Benjamin Segal & Rencheng Wang, The Bright
Side of Managerial Over-Optimism, 62 J. ACCT. & ECON. 46 (2016) (managerial optimism leads to additional effort that improves firm profitability and market value);
Adam C. Kolasinski & Xu Li, Can Strong Boards and Trading Their Own Firm’s Stock
Help CEOs Make Better Decisions? Evidence from Acquisitions by Overconfident CEOs, 48 J.
QUANTITATIVE & FIN. 1173 (2013) (finding that independent boards help overconfident CEOs avoid honest mistakes when they seek to acquire other companies);
Clemens A. Otto, CEO Optimism and Incentive Compensation, 114 J. FIN. ECON. 366
(2014) (showing how firms can take advantage of optimistic managers by adjusting
compensation contracts); Jian Wang, Jiliang Sheng & Jun Yang, Optimism Bias and
Incentive Contracts in Portfolio Delegation, 33 ECON. MODELLING 493 (2013) (finding
that optimistic managers take more risk than fully rational managers).
95. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate
Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461 (1986).
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the reasons the “inside” view might be wrong.96 Outsiders are capable of
drawing managerial attention to information that might indicate that their
perceptions are wrong.97 The push in corporate governance circles for
outside directors and outside chairmen of the board is consistent with this
prescription.
Overall, it seems likely that behavioral corporate finance could displace agency theories in their entirety. Several mechanisms are commonly
asserted to control agency costs, including shareholdings by insiders, institutions, and large blockholders, the presence of outside directors, debt,
competition from other managers, and the market for corporate control.98 All of these are amenable to—and most have already been analyzed through the lens of—managerial optimism.
V.

CONCLUSION

Corporate governance should abandon agency theory. Managers are
not agents and shareholders are not principals. The corporation creates a
separation of ownership (of shares) and ownership (of assets) that is critical to the success of the large firm. Ignoring these realities has generated
an enormous literature with little relevance to actual corporate governance problems. Agency theory sought to explain deviations from shareholder-value maximization with unobservable agency costs. Thus, for any
phenomenon under study, at least two answers were always available. The
current situation was optimal because some device or other controlled the
agency problem, or the current situation was suboptimal (or optimal at
the margin for the spend on monitoring and bonding costs) because
agency problems could not be controlled at acceptable cost. This is not
the first article to criticize the agency approach,99 but prior criticism has
not gone far enough. We should end the cult of agency.
I propose that the study of corporate governance change focus. Behavioral corporate finance holds the promise of bold advances that will
better explain corporate behavior, better integrate with existing corporate
96. See Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A
Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17 (1993).
97. See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund
Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008) (discussing hedge fund activism); Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 FOUNDATIONS AND TRENDS IN FIN. (2010) (same).
98. See Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Performance and Mechanisms
to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders, 31 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 377 (1996).
99. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, The Agency Cost Paradigm: The
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 38 SEATTLE L. REV. 561, 562 (2015) (“We think that [the
agency] paradigm stands quite weakened intellectually, and perhaps politically and
legally as well (though perhaps not!).”); Michael J. Meurer, Law, Economics, and the
Theory of the Firm, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 727, 731 (2004) (“The nexus of contract approach to corporate law has generated valuable insights, but this literature has
created the false impression that agency theory captures the essence of the theory
of the firm.”).
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law, and provide guidance to directors and officers that is of use to them.
It is time to let go of the theory of “plush carpets and company airplanes
. . . pursuing pet projects, and so on”100 and get on with the work of understanding real corporate governance in a way the working world can
take seriously.
100. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.
FIN. 737, 742 (1997); see also David Yermack, Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO
Perquisites, and Inferior Shareholder Returns, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 211, 211 (2006) (“Regression analysis finds no significant associations between CEOs’ perquisites and their
compensation or percentage ownership, but variables related to personal CEO
characteristics, especially long-distance golf club memberships, have significant explanatory power for personal aircraft use.”).
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